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Abstract 
Blockholders as the majority shareholders of the company are indicated to have the power to determine company 
policies, including dividends policies. The aim of this research is to investigate the role of blockholders on the dividend 
policy of Indonesian public companies. The analysis was carried out using 2016-2017 financial report from 213 
Indonesian public companies. A linear regression conducted to test the relationship between blockholders on dividend 
payout ratio, and to determine the moderating role of multiple blockholders. The finding of the study reveal that 
ownership concentration by blockholders proved to have negative significant influence on the decision the portion of 
profit distributed on dividends (dividends payout ratio). The moderation model testing result that existence of multiple 
blockholders is not moderate the relationship of ownership concentration by blockholders and dividend policies. 
Keywords: blockholders, multiple blockholders, dividend policies. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Dividend policy is one of the important decisions in corporate financial management, the policies about decision on 
whether profits earned by a company will be distributed to shareholders as dividends or will be retained in the form 
of retained earnings to financing investment in the future (Dennis & Osobov, 2008). The company's decision to 
distribute profits as dividends is also related to the funding strategy from external sources, if the company requires 
additional funds for investment. Conversely, if profits are decided to be retained to finance investment plans in the 
future, it means that dependence on external funding sources will be reduced. 
On the other hand, dividends distributed are important factors that determine shareholder wealth. Investors expect 
dividends distributed by companies to be stable or even increase over time (Anderson, 2009). Many investor prior to 
invest their fund on the companies with higher dividend payout. 
Based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), company executive has the role as agent on duty to control the 
company on the best way, while the role of shareholders are to be an principal to that controls the performance of 
executive at the company concerned. Executive must be able to apply various policies to create profits for the company 
and provide dividends for shareholders.  Conflict of interest from principle and agent creating the problem as agency 
conflict between principle and agent.  
There are several ways that can be taken to reduce agency problems, one of them is to bring the interests of 
management closer to the interests of shareholders or investors by increasing management ownership in the company 
concerned (Jensen 1986). Managerial participation in company ownership is expected to minimize agency conflict of 
principle and exexutive.  
Another way that can be taken to reduce agency problems is by increasing control of management performance 
through centralized share ownership. The concentration of share ownership by blockholders give more control by 
principle on company policies, including dividend policies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Blockholders prefer to take 
personal benefits that are not owned by minority shareholders in contributing some of corporate strategic.  
Some research has conducted to analyze the influence of ownership concentration by blockholders on dividend 
policies. Shleifer & Vishny (1986) found that companies with higher concentration ownership are frequently distribute 
dividend. Ullah, et al (2012) indicate that a positive effect from ownership concentration on dividend payout ratio.  
While some other studies get different results related to the influence of blockholders on dividend policies, Hu & 
Kumar (2004) states that dividend payments significantly decrease with the presence of large shareholders on the 
company. Mancinelli & Ozkan (2006) found that there was a negative relationship between dividend payments and 
shareholding decision making power. Harada & Nguiyen (2011) explain that there is a negative relationship between 
the existence of blockholders and dividend distribution by companies.  
 
2. Literatur Review 
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Dividend Policies 
Dividends represent the amount of corporate profits that are earned and distributed to shareholders, while the rest will 
be held as retained earning (Dennis & Osobov, 2008). Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR) is the amount of dividends paid 
to shareholders in relation to the total amount of net income the company generates. In other words, the dividend 
payout ratio measures the percentage of net income that is distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends. 
Dividend policy is important for companies because it involves 2 (two) main reasons (Brigham & Gordon, 1968); 1) 
Dividend payments will affect the stock price on the market, 2) Retained earnings are the most important source of 
additional capital for company growth.  
 
Blockholders  
Blockholders is an entity that has more than 5% of the total shares of a company (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Where 
the entity can be an employee, director or family of people in the company, and can also be an institution or other 
individuals that come from outside the company. 
.Ownership concentration have an important role in company policy, especially dividend payment policies. 
Concentrated ownership has more attention to overseeing corporate decisions with the aim of protecting its investment 
(Ullah, et al., 2012). On the companies with an higher ownership concentration will pay lower dividends because 
controlling shareholders have a greater influence on dividend policy (Ramli, 2010). 
Blockholders have an important role in reducing agency problems between shareholders and executive, because the 
presence of concentrated share ownership will facilitate the supervision of company management through voting rights 
at the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS). Blockholders ownership can lead to new agency conflicts if there is 
more than one majority ownership on the company (Edman, 2009). Dividend policy will become more complex on 
the multiple blockholders companies, which some blockholders can provide a different view of the company's 
dividend policy (La Porta, et al,  2000).  . 
 
3. Hypothesis 
 
This study examine the effect of shareholding ownership by blockholders on the company's dividend policy, and 
whether the existence of more than one blockholders in a company can moderate the effect of blockholders' ownership 
of shares on the company's dividend policy. The research framework is developed as the following path: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Research Conceptual Framework 
Referring to the research problem, conceptual framework, and some theories discussed above, two research hypothesis 
are considered as follow:  
H1 :  Companies with an higher concentrated ownership by blockholders are associated with less dividend paying 
firm.  
H2 : The existence of more than one blockholders in a company's share ownership moderates the influence of 
the blockholders on the company's dividend policy. 
4. Research Method 
 
The type of data in this study is quantitative data which consist of data for ownership structure obtained from company 
annual report and dividend payout collected from company individual performance. The Website of Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX) are the main source for related data of this research.  
Blockholders 
Ownership 
Dividend Policies 
Multiple 
Blockholders 
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Sample for this study consisted of company listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange that distribute dividend on the period 
from 2016 to 2017. The final sample consisted of 213 firm-year observations.  
Data analysis was performed using multiple regression analysis techniques. The dependent variable was dividend 
payout ratio which measured as dividend per share divided by earning per share. The independent variable was 
blockholders ownership variable which measured by the percentage of share ownership by blockholders of the total 
shares of the company. The multiple blockholders variable in this study is a dummy variable, where the company will 
be given a score of 1 if there are more than one shareholder in the company with more than 5% ownership, and a score 
of 0 will be given if there are no more than one blockholders in the company's share ownership. 
To analyze the effect of blockholders ownership on dividend policy, we estimated empirical model as follows 
(Formula 1):  
𝐷𝑃𝑂 =  𝐵0 +  𝐵1𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑒  
To examine the role of multiple-blockholders as moderating variable on the relationship between shareholding 
ownership by blockholders and dividend policy, we conducted formula 2 as follows:  
   𝐷𝑃𝑂 =  𝐵2 +  𝐵3𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝐵4𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝 + 𝐵5𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∗ 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝 + 𝑒 
Where DPO is a dividend policy, block is ownership of shares by blockholders, while multip is the existence of 
multiple blockholders in a company.  
Descriptive Data Analysis  
 
Before testing the research hypothesis, we conducted a descriptive analysis to describe the company-company 
conditions based on the variables studied. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the three variables in this study.  
Tabel 1. Descriptive Data 
Variabel Minimum Maximum Mean Standar Deviasi 
DPO 0.002 0.347 0.190 0.111 
Block 0.154 0.989 0.698 0.189 
Multip 0 1 0.732 0.440 
 
From table 1 it can be seen that there is a high concentration of share ownership on the sample companies. The data 
shows that the average share ownership by blockholders is 69.8%, and the highest portion of share ownership owned 
by blockholders of the company is 98.9%. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
To test the effect of the concentration of shareholding by blockholders on dividend policy we conducted a regression 
analysis from the block variable to DPO. The test results are presented in the following table:  
 
Table 2. Regression Analysis 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.271526705 0.028782003 9.433905728 7.4846E-18 
X (Block) -0.117457207 0.039831408 -2.948859045 0.003549009 
 
The results of the regression analysis in table 2 show that the effect of the blockholders variable on the DPO variable 
has a coefficient of -0.1775 with a p value of 0.0036. It can be concluded that there is a significant effect of blockholder 
ownership on the company's dividend policy, a negative coefficient number can be interpreted that the ownership of 
shares that is increasingly concentrated by the blockholders, the smaller the dividends paid by the company. 
Furthermore, to examine the multiple blockholders variable as a moderating relationship between share-ownership by 
blockholders on company dividend policy. The regression test is performed twice based on Formula 1 as a model 
before there is a moderating variable and the regression formula 2 is a model with an moderating variable. The results 
of testing of moderating variables are shown in table 3 below: 
 
Tebel 3. Test Results of Multiple Blockholders as Moderating Variable 
Regression Statistics 
Sebelum 
Moderating 
Model 
Setelah 
Moderating 
Model 
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Multiple R 0.198949644 0.198992467 
R Square 0.039580961 0.039598002 
Adjusted R Square 0.035029212 0.025812327 
Standard Error 0.10942713 0.109948483 
 
From Table 3 it appears that the R square value of the regression test before the moderating model is 0.03958, while 
the R square value of the regression test in the moderating model is 0.03958, or it can be concluded that the existence 
of multiple blockholders does not moderate the relationship between the concentration of share ownership by 
blockholders and company dividend policy. 
5. Discussion 
 
The results showed that the concentration of ownership by blockholders had a significant negative effect on dividend 
policy. The higher concentration ownership of the firm indicates that lower dividends paid by the company. 
Blockholders can provide an effective monitoring role by having more attention to oversight of corporate decisions 
with the aim of protecting their investment (Thanatawee, 2013). The results of these studies support the results of 
several previous studies: Chai (2010), Ullah, et al. (2012), and Hamzah & Abdul (2014). 
Dividend policies will provide value of the company in the future. So there are various motivations of the shareholders 
will be involved in that decision. Basically, investor motivation can be grouped into two, namely long term motivation 
and short term motivation. Investors with short-term investment motivation will prefer a large portion of dividend 
payments by companies, while conversely, investors with long-term investment motivation will be more supportive 
of retained earnings policies (Holderness, 2003). The negative effect of the ownership concentration of blockholders' 
on dividend policy is due to the fact that blockholders are investors with long-term investment motivation so that it is 
not oriented towards receiving dividends from the company but on increasing the value of the company (Cronqist. & 
Fahlenbrach R. (2009). 
This research also found that the existence of multiple blockholders does not moderate the relationship between the 
concentration of blockholders' ownership on the company's dividend policy. The existence of other blockholders in 
the company's share ownership with the number of shares not as much as the main blockholders does not affect the 
ability of the main blockholders as controller shareholders in exercising control over company policies, including 
dividend policy (Hamzah & Zulkifli, 2014).  
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